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Abstract 
Anchoring is a well-known effect leading to bias in estimation 
in various decision-making contexts. A question, however, is 
whether individuals with greater numerical and academic 
ability would be less prone to this effect than others because 
of greater ability to discern the value being estimated. In light 
of growing interest in the role of individual differences in bias 
susceptibility, anchoring was examined in a simulated poker-
like card game, using people with varying levels of academic 
achievement and psychometric reasoning scores. The results 
showed that anchoring susceptibility was unrelated to 
education levels, but negatively associated with numerical 
reasoning and cognitive reflection scores. This result, 
however, was mediated by task expertise because participants 
with higher cognitive abilities were those more likely to 
display improvements in anchoring performance over the 
course of the experiment. 
Keywords: anchoring, individual differences, numerical 
ability, experience. 
Introduction 
Anchoring (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) describes a robust 
effect in which the estimates people make are affected by 
other numbers that they have recently seen. Specifically, 
people tend to anchor on such numbers and fail to adjust 
sufficiently away from them when making estimates. This 
has been shown to affect expert as well as naïve estimators 
(Northcraft & Neale, 1987); and can be influenced by both 
relevant and irrelevant anchor values (Thorsteinson, Breier, 
Atwell, Hamilton, & Privette, 2008) and by obviously 
wrong anchors (Quattrone, et al., 1984).  
Although of theoretical interest in its own right, anchoring 
also has practical consequences in applied settings. For 
example, in oil and gas exploration, ‘analogue’ data (i.e. 
data from a location judged to be analogous to the current 
location in some way) is regularly used as a starting point 
for discussions regarding the probability of making a 
discovery and on assessments of its likely size, value and 
cost to develop; therefore, anchoring can have a significant 
impact on decisions (Bratvold, Begg, & Campbell, 2002).  
As such, considerable time and effort is dedicated to making 
people aware of anchoring in decision making courses 
offered at university and in industry settings.  
The efficacy of this in reducing susceptibility, however, is 
doubtful. Research into anchoring has shown the effect to be 
highly resistant to awareness-based debiasing (Chapman & 
Johnson, 2002; Welsh, Begg, & Bratvold, 2006). As a result 
there is increasing interest in whether people’s susceptibility 
to anchoring might be  related to individual differences in 
cognitive abilities (Bergman, Ellingsen, Johanneson, & 
Svensson, 2010; Oechssler, Roider, & Schmitz, 2009; 
Stanovich & West, 2008) as, if this is the case, decision 
makers can be selected for their resistance to this bias.  
Individual Differences 
Plausibly, people with greater expertise in a particular area 
of decision-making should be less prone to biases such as 
anchoring. However, there is clear evidence to suggest that 
experts as well as novices are affected by anchors 
(Northcraft & Neale, 1987).   
In their study, Northcraft and Neale divided participants 
into two groups (expert and non-expert) based upon whether 
or not they were employed in real-estate. Participants were 
then asked to value houses after being shown a ‘listing 
price’ that acted as the anchor. All participants’ estimates 
were affected by the anchoring values. The researchers also 
demonstrated that less reasonable anchors had  less impact 
on the responses provided by their non-experts than more 
reasonable anchors. Somewhat surprisingly, though, they 
did not examine whether this effect was also observed in 
experts. In particular, they did not consider the possibility 
that ‘less reasonable’ anchors may have had an even lesser 
impact on the responses of experts.  
Another limitation of Northcraft and Neale’s (1987) study 
was that the division of their sample into expert and non-
expert was done entirely on the basis of whether or not a 
participant was employed in real estate and this, potentially, 
failed to capture more refined differences that could have 
been considered. For example, it might have been possible 
to have used years of experience as a (poor) proxy for 
expertise (for a discussion of the problems in defining 
expertise, see Malhotra, Lee, & Khurana, 2005).  
Alternately, one could follow on from recent work by 
Frederick (2005), itself building on a tradition of work by 
Stanovich and West (see, e.g. 1998, 2008), that has shown 
cognitive abilities to be predictive of susceptibility to a 
range of decision making biases.  
Stanovich and West (2008), in fact, concluded that 
anchoring was one bias not lessened by higher cognitive 
abilities, a result replicated by Oechssler et al (2009); 
however, a more recent experiment (Bergman, et al., 2010) 
found  that people scoring higher on Frederick’s (2005) 
CRT measure (a measure of ‘cognitive reflection; i.e., how 
likely a person is to engage rational rather than intuitive 
reasoning) and on a general cognitive ability test were less 
susceptible to anchors. These inconsistent findings, 
combined with the earlier insights of Northcraft and Neale 
(1987), suggest a need for further consideration of the 
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association between expertise, cognitive ability and 
anchoring effects.  
One possibility is that cognitive ability, in and of itself, 
plays no role in reducing susceptibility to anchoring but 
instead acts only as a mediating factor in the development of 
expertise. If this is the case, then this would predict that the 
relationship between anchoring and cognitive ability be 
visible only sometimes (where expertise has been 
developed). 
Research Goals 
The first aim of this project was to examine whether 
increased expertise (loosely defined here as greater 
experience with a specific task) is associated with decreased 
susceptibility to bias resulting from anchoring. Second, we 
intended to establish whether cognitive ability was related to 
anchoring susceptibility, or expertise, or both. Finally, we 
were interested to see whether educational level predicted 
bias susceptibility – as university courses seem the most 
likely place for a person to have previously encountered the 
concept of anchoring. 
Recognizing the difficulties in defining expertise within 
any given field, we also wanted to create a task on which we 
could measure participant’s actual expertise so that this 
could be compared with self-rated expertise. For this reason, 
we chose a card-game with similar rules to poker (see 
below). This task enabled us to run a large number of trials 
and calculate the exact probabilities that the participants 
would be estimating. It also made it possible to observe 
people’s actual expertise (as reflected in their task 
performance) and whether this was related to how much 
prior experience they had with games of this nature. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 102 university students and members of 
the general public, recruited via posters and research 
participation email lists from around the University of 
Adelaide. The sample had a mean age of 22.5 (SD = 4.89) 
and consisted of 34 males and 68 females. All participants 
received $50 for their completion of a three-hour battery of 
tasks including those described in this paper.   
Materials and Procedure 
Participants completed an online questionnaire, which 
included gathering demographic details, prior to coming in 
to the laboratory for testing. 
 
Demographics. In addition to age and sex, a number of 
further measures were gathered as part of the survey of the 
sample. These included the level of education on a 7-point 
scale indicating various levels of academic achievement. As 
a result of the small sizes of several of these categories, 
responses were recoded on a 3 point scale: 1, have not 
attended university (n = 22); 2, current university student (n 
= 58); and 3, university graduate (n = 22). 
Additionally, participants were asked to rate their 
familiarity with poker and other card games (again a 7 point 
scale ranging from 1, no familiarity, to 7, very familiar). 
 
Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT). As described by 
Frederick (2005), the CRT is designed to measure a 
person’s level of “cognitive reflection”; that is, how likely 
they are to engage rational and reflective System II 
reasoning rather than relying on the fast and intuitive 
System I reasoning that leads to bias (Stanovich & West, 
2000). Participants answer three questions and are scored 
either right or wrong. CRT score is simply the number of 
questions that a person gets right – from 0 to 3. 
In addition to predicting susceptibility to a number of 
biases, this measure shows a strong relationship with 
educational level in Frederick’s (2005) data. 
 
Numerical Abilities Test (NAT). A short version of the  
Numerical Abilities scale from the Differential Aptitude 
Test (Bennett, Seashore, & Wesman, 1989) was prepared, 
asking 12 rather than 48 questions and restricting time to 9 
minutes rather than 36. A participant’s score was simply the 
number of questions they answered correctly.  
This task was computerized as a Matlab GUI and 
conducted in the laboratory immediately prior to the 
anchoring task described below. 
 
Anchoring Task. The anchoring task was designed as a 
card game based on poker but utilizing a deck of 16 cards 
consisting of the cards 1 through 4 in four suits (blue, red 
green and yellow). Three cards comprised each hand.  
The value of hands was determined from their probability 
of occurrence and described in poker terminology – thus a 
“straight flush” (a run of adjacent numbers in a single suit) 
was the best hand, followed by “3-of-a-kind”, a “flush”, a 
“straight” and then a “pair of [4s, 3s, 2s or 1s]”. 
A computer program was written in Matlab to conduct the 
card game. To ensure comparability between participants, 
the computer used the same sequence of hands for all 
participants. Given hands of 3 drawn from a deck of 16, 
there were 560 possible hands that a player could receive 
and, with 4 suits, this enabled us to select one quarter of 
these hands as a representative sample – that is, including 
exactly the proportion of straight flushes, flushes, and so on 
that one would expect from 140 hands. 
The rules of the game were explained to participants in 
advance as follows: 
 
1. The rarer the card combination, the greater the 
likelihood of its winning. The computer will tell you 
what type of hand you have.  
2. You must place a bet at every stage – of either 10c or 
30c. Bet small when you expect to lose and high 
when you expect to win. 
3. If you and the house (computer) have exactly the 
same type of hand, the house wins. 
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The computer, at each of 140 trials, showed the player 
their hand (from the representative sample described above), 
described it using the terminology given above, and asked 
them to answer two questions. The first was whether they 
believed that their chance of winning was greater or less 
than a given number – the anchor. (Anchors were a 
randomly generated sequence of values ranging from 5 to 
95%; however, to ensure comparability across participants, 
the same sequence of anchors was used for each.) 
After selecting the greater than or less than option, the 
participant was asked to make their estimate of how likely 
they thought they were to win the current hand given the 
cards that they had, and to place a bet of either 10c or 30c.  
Once the participant’s bet had been placed, the 
computer’s hand was revealed and the winner was declared. 
Participants started the game with a $10 ‘stake’ and the 
computer updated this after each hand according to the bets 
they had made and whether they had won or lost. These 
winnings did not affect the amount that participants were 
paid but, rather, were included as another means of tracking 
the participants’ performance. 
Results 
Measures 
As described above, most of the measures were self-
explanatory and were based on, either, response scales or 
from the raw total scores from cognitive tests. The 
anchoring task measures, however, are described below. 
 
Anchoring. Each participant completed 140 trials of the 
anchoring task and a person’s susceptibility to anchors was 
measured by calculating the rank order partial correlation 
between the anchors and their estimates (controlling for the 
true value) across all trials. This was done for the 
experiment as a whole but also for each of the four quarters 
of the task in order to examine learning across the task.  
Higher values on this measure indicate greater 
susceptibility to the anchoring effect – that is, greater 
agreement between their estimates of the likelihood of their 
winning a hand and the anchor values they were shown 
prior to making those estimates. 
 
Accuracy. The accuracy measure was calculated as the rank 
order partial correlation between the participant’s estimates 
and the true values while controlling for the effect of the 
anchor. As for the anchoring measure, this was done across 
all trials and by quarter. 
Higher values on this measure indicate greater accuracy -
that is, agreement between a person’s estimates and the true 
likelihood of their winning a hand. This measure serves as a 
check on people’s performance and thus expertise. 
 
Winnings. Rather than using the raw amount that a 
participant won over the course of the task as the measure, 
we compared their winnings with the optimal winnings. 
That is, we determined what an optimal decision maker, 
able to calculate the probability of winning each hand 
accurately, would bet at each point and calculated their 
winnings. For the sample as a whole and for each quarter of 
the trials, we calculated a participant’s winnings as the 
percentage of the optimal winnings.  
Anchoring Task Statistics 
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for our sample 
across all 140 trials of the anchoring task. 
 
Table 1. Mean and 95% CI for each measure from the 
anchoring task, calculated across 140 trials. The second 
column shows the scale of the measure. 
 
 Scale Mean CI95 
Anchoring 0 to 1* 0.24 [0.20 0.27] 
Accuracy 0 to 1* 0.86 [0.83 0.90] 
Winnings 0 to 100% 80.1 [75.2 85.0] 
* Note – while the anchoring and accuracy measures can, 
technically, take negative values, these were not predicted to 
occur and observation of the sample confirmed this with no 
accuracy scores and only 7 of the 102 anchoring scores 
being below zero - and none of these being lower than -0.09. 
 
As indicated in Table 1, there is evidence of the anchoring 
effect in the data. Participant estimates correlated with the 
anchors at an average of 0.24 and examination of the 
confidence interval around this indicates that this effect was 
reliably non-zero. Notwithstanding, the results suggest that 
people were quite good at estimating the actual probability, 
with the correlations between their estimates and the true 
value averaging above 0.8 and their winnings being around 
80% of what an optimal player would earn. 
























Figure 1. Mean scores on the three anchoring task measures 
with 98.7% CIs, divided by task quarter (i.e, 35 trials).  
 
Figure 1 summarizes the three anchoring task measures 
across the four quarters of the task. The anchoring measure, 
in particular, shows a clear improvement quarter-by-quarter. 
Given that there is only a one-in-24 chance of seeing the 
pattern of results observed here – constant reduction across 
four stages - the data therefore provides strong evidence for 
a general trend of improvement. The evidence for 
improvements in accuracy and winnings, by comparison, is 
less clear. In particular, while the accuracy measure seems 
to show a trend toward improvement across the task, the 
corresponding confidence intervals largely overlap 
indicating that not too much should be drawn from this. The 
winnings data, by comparison, seem only to show a distinct 
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difference between the first and second halves of the task.  
Analyses compared performance between the first and 
last quarters, looking at the mean differences on each of the 
three measures and finding evidence for improvement in all 
three cases as none of the confidence intervals around these 
mean differences contain zero: MDanch = -0.10 CI95 = [-.14 -
.06]; MDac c= .04, CI95 = [.01 .06]; and MDwin = 19.7, CI95 = 
10.5 28.9]. 
We also calculated the size of the changes in the three 
measures using the non-parametric common language effect 
size measure A (Ruscio, 2008), which indicates the 
probability of a randomly chosen datum from one condition 
being better than a randomly chosen datum from the 
alternate condition. This indicated a large effect of learning 
on anchoring, a medium to large effect on accuracy and a 
small to medium effect on winnings, A = 0.71, 0.67 and 
0.61, respectively, when comparing 1st and 4th quarters. 
That is, there is a clear trend of improvement on 
performance on the anchoring task as the task progresses 
through its 140 trials; specifically, as expertise (measured in 
terms of accuracy and winnings) increases, susceptibility to 
anchoring decreases. 
Predicting Anchoring 
To test for relationships between our independent measures 
and those from the anchoring task described above, we 
conducted a series of rank order correlations. These are 
given in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Rank order correlations between cognitive tasks, 
experience measures and performance on the anchoring 
task.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Anchoring - <.01 .10 .13 .20 .98 
2. Accuracy -.41 - <.01 .55 .04 .09 
3. Winnings -.17 .49 - .03 .03 .04 
4. NAT -.15 .06 .22 - <.01 .01 
5. CRT -.13 .20 .22 .44 - .24 
6. Poker Exp. .00 .17 .20 .25 .12 - 
Note: the bottom left triangle shows the correlation 
strengths while the top right shows the corresponding p-
values (two-tailed). N = 102 in all cases. Bold correlations 
are significant at the .05 level. Italic correlations are 
significant at .05 if considered as directional hypotheses. 
 
When one considers Table 2, it can be seen that the 
majority of effects (14 of 15) are in the directions one would 
expect. Anchoring is negatively related to people’s accuracy 
and winnings and also to both of the cognitive measures. 
Interestingly, however, poker experience has no noticeable 
effect on susceptibility to anchors in this task. Accuracy, 
similarly, shows the expected relationships, being the best 
predictor of people’s winnings and positively related to the 
CRT measure, people’s self-rated poker experience and 
even, weakly, to the NAT. Similarly, the correlations 
between winnings and all the other measures were in the 
expected direction. That is, in addition to the correlations 
noted above, winnings correlates positively with CRT, NAT 
and poker experience. 
Focusing on the individual difference variables, it is 
evident that they show logically coherent relationships. CRT 
and NAT scores were most strongly related to one another 
and all of their correlations with the anchoring measures, 
while weak, were in the expected direction.  
Anchoring and Expertise 
The above results show that our independent measures do, 
weakly, predict performance on the anchoring task. 
However, given that learning is occurring during the task, 
we need to establish how this increasing ‘expertise’ and our 
measures relate. Importantly, we need to ascertain whether 
differential ability on these measures predicts changes in 
susceptibility to anchoring as the task progresses.  
As an initial test of the relationship between expertise (on 
the anchoring task) and our other measures, we calculated 
rank order correlations between the anchoring measure and 
each of these for just the first quarter of trials – when 
expertise was lowest. This confirmed that, across the first 35 
trials of the task, the correlations between anchoring and all 
three of NAT, CRT and poker experience were zero, ρ = -
.02, .00 and .04, respectively. 
To further examine this question, the sample was divided 
into people who improved their performance on the 
anchoring measure (n = 69) and those who did not (n = 33) 
and these groups were compared (Figure 2).  
























Figure 2. Mean NAT score, Poker Experience and CRT 
score, with 95% CIs, by improvement group (i.e, whether 
participants reduced their susceptibility to anchoring). 
 
Inspection of the confidence intervals in Figure 2 suggests 
that all of these measures show some difference between the 
participants who did and did not improve their performance 
(that is, reduced their susceptibility to anchoring). 
Specifically, the people who became less susceptible to 
anchoring were those who scored higher on the NAT and 
CRT and rated their own poker experience more highly. 
These effects are small to medium for the cognitive 
measures A = 0.59 and 0.63 for the NAT and CRT, 
respectively, and medium for poker experience, A = 0.64. 
We also examined the number of participants from each 
education group who improved or did not improve their 
anchoring score across the course of the task. Table 3 shows 
the observed and expected sizes of each group for the six 
combinations of education level and improvement. 
Table 3 shows marked deviations from statistical 
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expectations. Specifically, group 1 (non-university 
educated) have fewer improvers than would be expected 
while group 3 (university graduates) almost all showed 
improvement on the anchoring measure. A χ2-test confirmed 
that the probability of seeing such divergence in the absence 
of an effect was very low, p = .014. The effect, comparing 
educational levels of the group showing improvement and 
those not, was of medium strength, A = 0.66. 
 
Table 3. Observed and expected sub-group sizes, comparing 
education level and improvement on anchoring measure. 
 Education Group 
Improve 1 2 3 
No 12 / 7.1 18 / 18.8 3 / 7.1 
Yes 10 / 14.9 40 / 39.2 18 / 14.9 
 
Overall, these results suggest that the relationships 
observed above between anchoring and the individual 
differences are largely mediated by expertise. That is, 
people who score better on the cognitive measures, while no 
less susceptible at the beginning of the task, become 
increasingly less susceptible to anchoring as the task 
progresses, with the result that, overall, a relationship is 
seen between cognitive ability and anchoring, Similarly, 
while prior experience with poker offered no immediate 
advantage, it did predict improvement on this, related, task. 
Education and Anchoring 
A potential confound in tasks such as these is participants’ 
level of education. As noted above, this is known to be 
strongly related to Frederick’s (2005) CRT measure and is 
likely to relate to numerical ability as well. A university 
education also seems the most likely way that a person 
might have become aware of the anchoring effect and, thus, 
potentially, be less susceptible. Therefore, participants’ 
scores on the anchoring measures, cognitive measures and 
poker expertise were examined in relation to their 


















































Figure 3. Means for anchoring task and independent 
measures with 98.3% confidence intervals, by education 
group. 
Despite our predictions of a possible association between 
anchoring performance and education, the results in the top 
row of Figure 3 show little difference in scores between the 
different groups excepting that university students and 
graduates are more variable in their performance. Similarly, 
there is no apparent difference between any of the groups in 
relation to their level of poker experience. 
As was expected, however, there were clear differences 
between the education groups on the cognitive measures. 
Both of the university groups scored higher than the non-
university group on the NAT, whereas scores on the CRT 
seemingly increase across each educational level. The sizes 
of these effects were calculated, indicating that the 
difference between CRT scores in the different groups 
varied from weak to medium/strong, A = 0.64, 0.57 and 0.70 
when comparing groups 1 and 2, 2 and 3, and 1 and 3, 
respectively. By comparison, the difference between 
education groups on the NAT varied from very small to 
very strong, A = 0.77, 0.52 and 0.78, comparing groups 1 
and 2, 2 and 3, and 1 and 3, respectively. 
Discussion 
Taken as a whole, the results were generally consistent 
with our predictions. Participants showed clear anchoring 
effects on our task but the degree of bias decreased as 
people played more and more hands of the card game and, 
presumably, learnt the underlying probabilities of winning 
with the different types of hand. The average correlations 
between participants’ estimates and the anchors they had 
seen reduced from 0.28 in the first quarter of the trials to 
0.12 in the last.  
Of equal interest is the fact that both of the cognitive 
measures we considered, the NAT and CRT, predicted 
susceptibility to the anchoring effect. The overall effect of 
this was weak, however, with correlations of -0.15 and -
0.12, and we note that these measures do not predict 
anchoring susceptibility at the beginning of the task. Rather, 
people who scored higher on numerical ability and cognitive 
reflection were more likely to show reduced susceptibility to 
anchoring as the task progressed. Similarly, self-rated poker 
experience had no, overall, relationship with anchoring but 
did   predict improvement on the anchoring measure as the 
task progressed (see Figure 3). 
Finally, participant’s level of education was also related 
to anchoring susceptibility. In particular, it predicted 
whether their susceptibility to anchoring would decrease as 
they continued in the task – an unsurprising finding given 
the strong relationships observed between NAT, CRT and 
education level. 
In general terms, then, it seems that the experiment 
provides evidence for the value of considering individual 
differences when looking at biases such as anchoring. It also 
confirms previous findings (Frederick, 2005; Stanovich & 
West, 1998, 2008) linking bias susceptibility to cognitive 
ability. 
An important caveat, however, is that the larger 
differences observed here are those linked to experience and 
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expertise. That is, differences in cognitive ability are, in this 
study at least, more useful for predicting the rate of increase 
in expertise rather than direct susceptibility to biases. 
Consequently, it is the increase in expertise that accounts for 
the larger differences in susceptibility to biases. For this 
reason, we are left in the position of having to define 
expertise within a field of interest before being able to state 
definitively that ‘experts’ will be less affected by anchors. 
A second concern is whether what we have called 
‘expertise’ herein is representative of expertise in real 
domains. Clearly we have a practice effect but expertise 
generally refers to more durable, transferable abilities. 
Given the difficulties in defining expertise, however, we 
feel justified in calling this a necessary first step and 
certainly regard it as an improvement over previous studies 
where expertise is self-rated or simply assumed from 
vocation. 
Future Research 
This experiment was, primarily, concerned with establishing 
that anchoring susceptibility varies with expertise. As such, 
and given our choice of a poker-based game, we have 
concentrated on the small number of cognitive tasks we 
thought most relevant to such a task – given previous 
findings. The nature of anchoring, however, where a value 
acts to bias recall of knowledge about another value being 
estimated, suggests that a consideration of other cognitive 
abilities would be valuable. In particular, aspects of memory 
would seem to be involved and a consideration of individual 
differences in memory would, therefore, be informative. 
More work is also required to establish the relationships 
between the various types of cognitive bias commonly 
discussed. While there have been several attempts at 
creating a taxonomy of biases, these have largely relied on 
assumptions regarding the underlying heuristic processes 
(see, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). A large-scale factor 
analysis of bias questions and a range of cognitive measures 
would enable the relationships between various biases to be 
placed on a firmer footing. 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, we have demonstrated that susceptibility to 
anchoring is related to the cognitive abilities we have 
examined and other measures such as educational level and 
self-rated expertise on related tasks. More importantly, 
however, it seems that these abilities mediate peoples’ 
development of expertise and it is this expertise within a 
specific estimation context that actually reduces 
susceptibility to anchoring. 
Therefore, if one is confident that the person making an 
estimate is an expert, then one can also expect that their 
estimates will be less affected by anchoring values than less-
expert individuals. The use of simple cognitive measures 
such as the NAT and CRT, however, while somewhat 
predictive of differences in expertise, will not be sufficient 
to enable this conclusion to be reached. Instead, a measure 
of expertise on the task in question will be required. 
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